University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Resource Economics Department Faculty
Publication Series

Resource Economics

2001

Economic incentives for coordinated management
of forest land: a case study of southern New
England
R Klosowski
T Stevens
D Kittredge
D Dennis

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/resec_faculty_pubs
Recommended Citation
Klosowski, R; Stevens, T; Kittredge, D; and Dennis, D, "Economic incentives for coordinated management of forest land: a case study
of southern New England" (2001). Forest Policy and Economics. 155.
10.1016/S1389-9341(00)00035-6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Resource Economics at ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Resource Economics Department Faculty Publication Series by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

Economic incentives for coordinated management of forest
land: a case study of southern New England
R. Klosowski a , T. Stevens a,U , D. Kittredge b, D. Dennis d
b

a
Department of Resource Economics, Draper Hall, Uni¨ ersity of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003, USA
Department of Natural Resources Conser¨ ation, Holdsworth Hall, Uni¨ ersity of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003, USA
d
USDA Forest Ser¨ ice, Northeast Experiment Station, Burlington, VT, USA

Received 28 March 2000; received in revised form 3 October 2000; accepted 13 October 2000

Abstract
Coordinated management among many private forest land owners will often be required to achieve ecosystem
management at the landscape scale. A case study of landowners in southern New England shows that although most
hold favorable attitudes towards coordinated management, economic incentives may be needed to actually implement coordinated management programs. Yet the conjoint analyses used in this study suggests that economic
incentives, such as property tax reductions, are not likely to substantially increase the probability that coordinated
management programs will actually be undertaken. For example, an increase in property tax savings from $706 per
year to $2000 per year only increased the probability of program adoption from 1.4 to 5.6%. Alternative ways in
which coordinated management programs might be marketed are discussed. 䊚 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights
reserved.
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1. Introduction
Landscapes large enough for effective ecosystem management ŽEM. often have many owners
ŽBrunson et al., 1996.. Although forest land frag-
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mentation continues to increase worldwide, this
problem is particularly apparent in much of the
eastern United States, western Europe and the
formerly communist countries of central and eastern Europe. In southern New England, for example, more than 75% of forest land is classified as
non-industrial private forest, NIPF, and over 55%
of this land is in parcels that are less than 100
acres ŽBirch, 1996.. Some degree of coordinated
management among many private owners will,

therefore, be required to achieve EM at the landscape scale.
Previous research suggests that although most
landowners in southern New England hold favorable attitudes toward the concept of coordinated
management to achieve EM objectives ŽRickenbach et al., 1998., the majority would probably
not actually undertake coordinated management
programs that involve either explicit or implicit
cost to themselves ŽStevens et al., 1999.. Economic
incentives may therefore be needed to accomplish
the degree of coordination required for successful
EM, but little is known about the relationship
between incentives and the likelihood of coordinated management program participation.
This paper focuses on a case study of the effect
of economic incentives on the probability of NIPF
landowner participation in coordinated management programs. The impacts of several other factors on program participation, like harvest restrictions, and landowner characteristics, are also investigated.

2. Background
Surveys of NIPF landowners conducted by
Brunson et al. Ž1996. and by Rickenbach et al.
Ž1998. indicate that most landowners in southern
New England are favorably disposed to the idea
of coordinated management to achieve effective
EM. However, Brunson et al. Ž1996. also found
that few respondents would definitely be willing
to undertake management activities jointly without first seeing examples of how this would work.
More recently, Stevens et al. Ž1999. surveyed
1250 southern New England residents owning 10
acres or more of forest land. A conjoint analysis
was used in which each owner was asked to rate
four different hypothetical management scenarios
that are examples of ones that might be applied
in an EM plan, on a scale of 1᎐10 with 10
indicating scenarios, if any, the individual would
definitely undertake. Management activities in
each scenario included maintenance of apple trees
for wildlife habitat, protection of rare ferns, improvement of a recreational trail, and harvest of a
specified percentage of timber land. A split sam-

ple survey approach was employed wherein
landowners were partitioned into two groups.
Each received an identical survey except that in
one group all management activities would be
coordinated with two neighbors while the other
group was asked about the same management
activities for a single equivalent parcel owned by
the individual.
The results indicated that these landowners
would be as likely to undertake coordinated management programs as they would be to undertake
the same programs independently. However, the
probability of undertaking any of the management scenarios examined in this study was quite
low; the probability of program adoption ranged
from 0.02 to 0.18, suggesting that economic incentives may be needed to inspire landowners to
participate in coordinated management among
properties.
A second conjoint study by Stevens et al. Ž2000.
presented 1116 southern New England landowners with four management scenarios; maintenance of the status quo Ždo nothing. and three
alternatives involving coordinated management to
be achieved by setting aside a portion of a hypothetical tract of land to create a buffer zone to
provide a wildlife corridor connecting two larger
off-property wildlife habitats. The alternative scenarios involved: Ž1. various levels of acreage set
aside for the buffer zone; Ž2. a range of annual
costs of buffer zone maintenance through planting and soil stabilization; and Ž3. three levels of
increase in the population of a rare species of
wood turtle downstream of, Žand off. the
landowner’s hypothetical property. The probability of coordinated program adoption ranged
between 0.13 and 0.52, depending on the conjoint
model specification, for a program that: Ž1. sets
aside a 12-acre buffer zone; Ž2. costs each
landowner $200 per year; and Ž3. results in a 12%
increase in the turtle population. However, since
all survey respondents were already enrolled in a
forest stewardship management program, the estimated probability of coordinated program adoption is undoubtedly higher for this group than for
the forest landowner population in general. In
other words, this study also tends to suggest that
incentives will probably be needed to implement

coordinated management programs that require
participation by a majority of owners.

3. Methods
In order to investigate the effect of economic
incentives on the likelihood of coordinated program adoption among southern New England
landowners, a survey was administered to five
landowner focus groups in the spring, 1999. Focus
group participants were solicited by phone from a
list of several hundred Massachusetts landowners
who were identified through town property ownership records. Everyone contacted by phone was
offered $50 to participate in one of the focus
groups. A total of 57 landowners participated in
this study.
The survey administered to these focus groups
consisted of three parts: Ž1. a preliminary set of
questions; Ž2. conjoint questions consisting of a
series of alternative coordinated management
programs that each participant was asked to rate;
and Ž3. follow-up questions 1. The preliminary
questions, which dealt mainly with landowner
traits and attitudes, included questions on the
amount of land owned, reasons for ownership,
gender, age, income from the land and other
sources, membership in organizations and enrollment in existing forest management programs.
The conjoint section of the survey presented a
scenario asking each respondent to assume that
they owned a hypothetical 100-acre parcel of land.
The market value of this land was specified, and
the portion that could be developed for residential use was defined. Annual land taxes and annual income available from timber harvest were
also specified. Graphics were used to show the
layout of this land. This helped to ensure that
participants were all considering the same scenario.
The participants were then told to imagine that
the Massachusetts Department of Environmental
Management, working with local landowners and

1

The survey instrument was pre-tested with a group of 10
landowners.

interest groups, had developed an EM plan for a
large area under multiple ownerships that included this parcel. Participation would be voluntary, but economic incentives would be provided
to encourage landowners to submit to certain
restrictions and requirements related to the management of the land.
Each participant was then presented with the
status quo Ždo nothing. and 16 alternative versions of the plan which they were asked to rate on
a scale of 1᎐9 in terms of the likelihood that they
would participate Ž1 s definitely would not; 9 s
definitely would.. Each version of the plan consisted of different combinations of levels of five
attributes:
䢇

䢇

䢇

䢇

䢇

Timber harvestrprotected areas. Harvest
would be allowed on some portion of the land
currently available Ž1r3, 2r3, or all., while the
remaining portion would be protected Ž2r3,
1r3, or none, respectively. from harvest.
Recreation. The landowner either would be
required to allow limited public access to a
trail corridor on their land or they would not
be required to do so.
Magnitude of incentive. The land would be
assessed for tax purposes at some portion of
its market value Ž1r3, 2r3, or full value..
Duration of commitment. The landowner
would have to make a commitment of either
10 years or 20 years.
Penalty. If the landowner withdrew from the
plan prior to the fulfillment of their commitment, they would be required to pay back
taxes on the difference between market values
and assessed value on the removed land, plus
interest on that difference, for either the most
recent 3 years or the most recent 6 years of
the unfulfilled commitment.

The participants were provided with specific
financial implications of each alternative based on
annual reduction in timber sale revenues associated with the ‘timber harvestrprotected areas’
attribute, and the annual reduction in taxes associated with the ‘magnitude of incentive’ attribute.
The combinations of attribute levels used in
this study were chosen using the SPSS Conjoint

software package, which yields an orthogonal design that allows analysis over the entire range of
combinations with the smallest possible subset of
those combinations. The 16 management pro-

grams and the status quo situation considered in
this study are summarized in Table 1.
Conjoint analysis was used to estimate the effect of economic incentives on the likelihood that

Table 1
Summary of coordinated programs
Timber harvestr
protected areasa

Recreation
public access

Magnitude of
incentiveb

Duration of
commitment

Penalty

Alternative 0
Žstatus quo.

All avail., none protect.
$1200ryear revenues
$0ryear loss

None

Assessed full
$3000ryear tax
$0ryear gain

NrA

NrA

Alternative 1

1r3 avail., 2r3 protect.
$400ryear revenues
$800ryear loss

Limited

Assessed 1r3
$1000ryear tax,
$2000ryear gain

20 years

Back taxes,
interest
6-year max.

Alternative 2

2r3 avail., 1r3 protect.
$800ryear revenues
$400ryear loss

Limited

Assessed 2r3
$2000ryear tax,
$1000ryear gain

10 years

Back taxes,
interest
3-year max.

Alternative 3

1r3 avail., 2r3 protect.
$400ryear revenues
$800ryear loss

None

Assessed full
$3000ryear tax
$0ryear gain

10 years

Back taxes,
interest
3-year max.

Alternative 4

All avail., none protect.
$1,200ryear revenues
$0ryear loss

None

Assessed 1r3
$1000ryear tax,
$2000ryear gain

10 years

Back taxes,
interest
6-year max.

Alternative 5

2r3 avail., 1r3 protect.
$800ryear revenues
$400ryear loss

None

Assessed full
$3000ryear tax
$0ryear gain

20 years

Back taxes,
interest
6-year max.

Alternative 6

All avail., none protect.
$1,200ryear revenues
$0ryear loss

None

Assessed full
$3000ryear tax
$0ryear gain

10 years

Back taxes,
interest
3-year max.

Alternative 7

All avail., none protect.
$1,200ryear revenues
$0ryear loss

Limited

Assessed full
$3000ryear tax
$0ryear gain

10 years

Back taxes,
interest
6-year max.

Alternative 8

All avail., none protect.
$1,200ryear revenues
$0ryear loss

Limited

Assessed 2r3
$2000ryear tax,
$1000ryear gain

20 years

Back taxes,
interest
6-year max.

Alternative 9

All avail., none protect.
$1,200ryear revenues
$0ryear loss

Limited

Assessed full
$3000ryear tax
$0ryear gain

20 years

Back taxes,
interest
3-year max.

Alternative 10

1r3 avail., 2r3 protect.
$400ryear revenues
$800ryear loss

Limited

Assessed full
$3000ryear tax
$0ryear gain

20 years

Back taxes,
interest
3-year max.

Table 1 Ž Continued.
Timber harvestr
protected areasa

Recreation
public access

Magnitude of
incentiveb

Duration of
commitment

Penalty

Alternative 11

All avail., none protect.
$1,200ryear revenues
$0ryear loss

None

Assessed full
$3000ryear tax
$0ryear gain

20 years

Back taxes,
interest
6-year max.

Alternative 12

2r3 avail., 1r3 protect.
$800ryear revenues
$400ryear loss

Limited

Assessed full
$3000ryear tax
$0ryear gain

10 years

Back taxes,
interest
6-year max.

Alternative 13

All avail., none protect.
$1,200ryear revenues
$0ryear loss

None

Assessed 2r3
$2000ryear tax,
$1000ryear gain

20 years

Back taxes,
interest
3-year max.

Alternative 14

All avail., none protect.
$1,200ryear revenues
$0ryear loss

Limited

Assessed 1r3
$1000ryear tax,
$2000ryear gain

10 years

Back taxes,
interest
3-year max.

Alternative 15

1r3 avail., 2r3 protect.
$400ryear revenues
$800ryear loss

None

Assessed 2r3
$2000ryear tax,
$1000ryear gain

10 years

Back taxes,
interest
6-year max.

Alternative 16

2r3 avail., 1r3 protect.
$800ryear revenues
$400ryear loss

None

Assessed 1r3
$1000ryear tax,
$2000ryear gain

20 years

Back taxes,
interest
3-year max.

a
b

Loss refers to potential timber reserve foregone as compared with the status-quo.
Gain refers to tax savings as compared with the status-quo.

landowners would participate in the plans presented. Three conjoint models were employed. In
all cases, individuals are assumed to make choices
that increase their utility or satisfaction. The utility that the ith individual derives from the jth
management program ŽUij . can be represented as:
Ui j s Z j BiUj q Ci Bi q e i j

Ž1.

where Z j is a vector of attributes Žtimber harvest,
tax incentive, public access, etc.. of the jth management program, Bi j is a vector of unknown
parameters Žor weights. associated with these attributes, Ci is a vector of other factors, including
individual characteristics influencing utility, Bi is
a vector of unknown parameters and ei is a
random variable.
In conjoint analysis, a respondent’s utility level
ŽUi j . for each of the j programs is not known.

Rather, a program rating ri j is observed. We
assume that:
ri j s h Ž Ui j .

Ž2.

where h is a transformation function. Each individual’s rating of alternative management programs therefore depends on the program attributes discussed above and characteristics of the
individual like age and income.
The first conjoint model employed in this study
examines the empirical relationship between EM
program attributes, other characteristics and respondent’s ratings. The model that was estimated
is:
Rate s B0 q B1 HARVLOSSq B2 RECACC
q B3 TAXGAINq B4
COMMITq B5 PENALTYq B6

ACRETOTq B7 GENDERq B8

considered here, individual utility is represented
by Eq. Ž1., and that individual utility derived from
forest land ownership in the status quo situation
may be expressed by:

AGE q B9 INCTOTy E q B10
INCTOTy Dq B11
INCTOTy C q B12

U
Ui0 s Z0 Bi0
q Ci Bi q e i0

INCTOTy B q B13
FORASSOCq B14 CHAP61q B15
SIP q B16 FOREVERq e

Ž4.

where Z0 represents the vector of forest land
attributes associated with the status quo. The
individual is assumed to enroll in a management
program if, and only if:

Ž3.

where Rate is the individual ratings of the 16
programs and the status-quo and all other variables are defined in Table 2. In this formulation
variables 6᎐16 are included to capture the effects
of tastes, preferences, and other circumstances
that vary among individuals.
As shown in Table 2, we hypothesize that program ratings Žand utility. decline with an increase
in harvest revenues foregone, length of program
commitment, and magnitude of penalty. However,
as the incentive ŽTAXGAIN. increases, we expect
an increase in program rating, all else held constant.
The second model assumes that when enrolled
in one of the coordinated management programs

Ui j G Ui0

Ž5.

Utility difference, dV, can then be expressed as:
dV s Ui j y Ui0

Ž6.

If utility is assumed to be linear, additive, and
separable with respect to all attributes, dV is
given by:
dV s Ui j y Ui0 q e i j y e i0

Ž7.

Table 2
Survey data summary
Coordinated management

Units

Minimum
value

Mean
value

Maximum
value

Expected
sign

Plan characteristics
HARVLOSS
RECACC
TAXGAIN
COMMIT
PENALTY

$ryear
1 s yes; 0 s no
$ryear
Years
Years

0
0
0
0
0

282.353
0.471
705.882
14.118
4.235

800
1
2000
20
6

y
qry
q
y
y

Landowner characteristics
ACRETOT
GENDER
AGE
INCTOTy E
INCTOTy D
INCTOTy C
INCTOTy B
FORASSOC
CHAP61
SIP
FOREVER

Total acres
1 if male
Years
$ ) 100 000
$75 000 to $100 000
$50 000 to $75 000
$25 000 to $50 000
1 s yes; 0 s no
1 s yes; 0 s no
1 s yes; 0 s no
1 if yes

3
0
29
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

140.364
0.768
55.286
0.091
0.091
0.291
0.345
0.429
0.839
0.375
0.679

972
1
82
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

The probability of program participation can then
be written as:
Prs G Ž dV .

Ž8.

where G is the probability function for the random component of utility Ž e i j y e i0 .. Assuming a
logit probability function for G, the probability of
program participation is:
Prs G Ž 1 q eydV .

y1

Ž9.

Empirical estimates of the probability of program participation therefore involve estimating
dV wsee Eq. Ž7.x. The following approximation of
utility difference was used:
dV s B0 q B1Ž Z . q B2 Ž C . q e

Ž 10.

where Z is the vector of the change in program
attributes from the status quo wsee Eq. Ž7.x, and
other variables are as defined above. From Eq.
Ž9., the model that is estimated is a binary logit
model:
EŽ Y . s

1
1 q eyŽ B 0qB1Ž Z .qB 2 ŽC .qe.

Ž 11.

where the dependent variable, Y, is a binary variable such that Y s 1 for programs that were rated
above the status quo, and Y s 0 otherwise, while
B0 , B1 , and B2 are estimated coefficients. Eq. Ž11.
can then be used to calculate the probability,
EŽ Y s 1., that a program with attributes Z is
preferred to the status quo.
The third model is the same as the second
except that the binary dependent variable, Y, is
set equal to one for programs that would definitely be undertaken Žrating s 9. and Y s 0 otherwise Žrating s 1᎐8.. Eq. Ž11. is then used to
calculate the probability that a specific program
would actually be adopted.

per year while the average incentive ŽTAXGAIN.
was a tax reduction of approximately $706 per
year. The average management program involved
a 14 year commitment and the average penalty
for early withdrawal Žback taxes plus interest . was
approximately 4 years.
In terms of landowner characteristics, the average participant owned 140 acres of forest land,
and was approximately 55 years old. Approximately 35% of the respondents had annual incomes in the $25 000 to $50 000 range, and approximately 43% belonged to a forestry association. Approximately two-thirds of the study respondents said they would consider a perpetual
commitment to a coordinated program ŽFOREVER..
Of particular importance is that 84% were enrolled in Chapter 61, which provides reduced
property taxes in exchange for timber management, and approximately 38% were enrolled in
the Stewardship Incentive Program, SIP. This
state program provides landowners with cost-sharing for management practices such as habitat
improvement and recreationraesthetics enhancements.
The Chapter 61 program, administered by the
Massachusetts Department of Environmental
Management, allows a substantial property tax
deferment for woodland owners who follow a
prescribed management plan. Only approximately
14% of all eligible landowners in the state are
enrolled. Therefore, the participants in this study
are clearly not representative of the population as
a whole. We suspect that Chapter 61 participants
are likely to be more knowledgeable about land
use issues and more likely to enroll in coordinated management programs.
Results of estimating the three conjoint models
are presented in Table 3.2 Focusing first on the
ratings model Žmodel 1., program ratings increased, as expected, with the magnitude of the

4. Results
The data derived from the surveys are presented in Table 2. As shown in Table 2, the
average value of harvests forgone associated with
the programs presented was approximately $282

2
Results from model 1 were derived from the OLS procedure. Ordered logit results were virtually identical. Results
from models 2 and 3 were derived from the logit estimating
procedure. Sensitivity of the results to model specification and
estimating method can be obtained from the senior author.

Table 3
Parameter estimates and significance
Model 1
Estimate
ŽProb ) < T <.

Model 2
Estimate
ŽProb ) 2 .

y0.000159
Ž0.5154.

y0.000055
Ž0.8272.

RECACC

0.030622
Ž0.8499.

0.131400
Ž0.4322.

TAXGAIN

0.001445UU
Ž0.0001.

0.000700UU
Ž0.0001.

HARVLOSS

Model 3
Estimate
ŽProb ) 2 .
y0.001010U
Ž0.0663.
y0.199400
Ž0.5194.
0.001120UU
Ž0.0001.

COMMIT

y0.039598UU
Ž0.0060.

y0.028800U
Ž0.0854.

y0.062100UU
Ž0.0285.

PENALTY

y0.122690UU
Ž0.0106.

y0.073900
Ž0.1851.

y0.101400
Ž0.2637.

ACRETOT

y0.001737UU
Ž0.0005.

y0.001120UU
Ž0.0285.

y0.001620
Ž0.1908.

GENDER

1.159723UU
Ž0.0001.

y0.280000
Ž0.1851.

0.420000
Ž0.3267.

AGE

0.000982
Ž0.8964.

y0.004470
Ž0.5658.

0.019900
Ž0.1557.

INCTOTy E

y0.656681U
Ž0.0687.

INCTOTy D 0.665580
Ž0.1008.

0.857600UU
Ž0.0181.

y14.787100
Ž0.9705.

0.793100U
Ž0.0590.

y0.805400
Ž0.2208.

INCTOTy C

y0.555135UU
Ž0.0450.

0.201700
Ž0.4847.

y1.701300UU
Ž0.0002.

INCTOTy B

y0.760633UU
Ž0.0057.

y0.447600
Ž0.1140.

y1.175300UU
Ž0.0041.

FORASSOC

0.460554UU
Ž0.0086.

CHAP61

y0.212037
Ž0.3790.

0.582000UU
Ž0.0017.

y0.016700
Ž0.9635.

0.201400
Ž0.4157.

y0.312200
Ž0.4438.
y0.345300
Ž0.3603.

SIP

0.497713UU
Ž0.0047.

y0.350500U
Ž0.0570.

FOREVER

0.354479U
Ž0.0621.

y0.089900
Ž0.6508.

U

Significant at 90%, UU significant at 95%.

0.396900
Ž0.2976.

economic incentive offered ŽTAXGAIN. and ratings decreased with length of commitment and
penalty. However, the value of timber harvests
forgone ŽHARVLOSS. and recreation access
ŽRECACC. were not statistically significant factors. This finding is consistent with several previous studies Žsee Rickenbach et al., 1998. suggesting that timber harvest is not a primary concern
of most NIPF landowners in southern New England.
It is also important to note that program ratings decreased with the total acreage held by the
landowner and increased for those who were enrolled in SIP or were members of a forestry
association. Enrollment in Chapter 61 was not
statistically significant, but this is likely due to the
lack of variability associated with this variable
Žalmost 84% of respondents were enrolled in
Chapter 61..
Results from model 2 Žestimates of landowner
interest . differ in several respects. The primary
difference from the perspective of this study is
that program penalty was not a statistically significant factor related to interest in program participation Ži.e. ranking above the status quo.. Also,
those who are enrolled in the SIP program are
less likely to be interested in coordinated management.
Results derived from the third model Žprobability that a program would definitely be undertaken. differ from the second in that the decrease
in the probability of program adoption with increases in the value of timber harvests forgone is
statistically significant. Perhaps the loss of timber
revenue was more difficult to tolerate when the
landowner was asked to make a firm commitment
to a program. As expected, the likelihood of coordinated program adoption increased with the incentive offered and decreased with the length of
commitment. However, penalty, total acres, and
membership in forestry associations, Chapter 61
or SIP were not statistically significant factors
influencing whether the coordinated program
would definitely be adopted Žrating s 9..
The estimates derived from model 2 ŽTable 3.
were used as shown in Eq. Ž11. to estimate the
probability that landowners are interested in
coordinated management programs Ži.e. rating

Table 4
Probabilities of program interest and adoptiona

HARVLOSS
RECACC
TAXGAIN
COMMIT
PENALTY
ACRETOT
GENDER
AGE
INCTOTy E
INCTOTy D
INCTOTy C
INCTOTy B
FORASSOC
CHAP61
SIP
FOREVER

Range of
values

Mean
value

Interest model 2
Probability
at min.

Probability
at max.

Probability
at min.

Adoption model 3
Probability
at max.

0᎐800
0᎐1
0᎐2000
0᎐20
0᎐6
3᎐972
0᎐1
29᎐82
0᎐1
0᎐1
0᎐1
0᎐1
0᎐1
0᎐1
0᎐1
0᎐1

282.353
0.471
705.882
14.118
4.235
140.364
0.768
55.286
0.091
0.091
0.291
0.345
0.429
0.839
0.375
0.679

0.444
0.425
0.324
0.541
0.518
0.478
0.494
0.469
0.421
0.422
0.426
0.479
0.380
0.399
0.473
0.455

0.433
0.457
0.660
0.399
0.408
0.236
0.424
0.411
0.632
0.618
0.476
0.370
0.523
0.448
0.387
0.433

0.018
0.015
0.006
0.032
0.021
0.017
0.010
0.008
0.051
0.015
0.022
0.020
0.014
0.018
0.016
0.010

0.008
0.012
0.056
0.010
0.011
0.004
0.015
0.023
0.000
0.007
0.004
0.006
0.014
0.013
0.011
0.016

a
Probabilities represent the likelihood of adoption or interest with the variable in question at its minimum or maximum value
and all other variables at their mean values. The probability with all variables at their mean values is 0.014 for model 3, and 0.440
for model 2.

greater than that given to the status quo.. The
results of these calculations are summarized in
Table 4. As shown in Table 4, the probability that
landowners are interested in these programs is
quite high. With all model 2 variables at mean
values, the probability that a study participant
would be interested in the ‘average’ coordinated
program is 0.44 Ž44%.. Even with no financial
incentive ŽTAXGAINs 0., 32% of owners would
be interested in coordination, and, the level of
interest increases dramatically as the incentive
increases.
However, as is also shown in Table 4, the
probability that landowners would actually adopt
programs of the type examined in this study is
very small, even when sizable incentives are offered. With all model 3 variables at their mean
values Žsee Table 4., the probability that the
‘average’ EM program would be adopted by the
group of landowners participating in this study
was only 0.014 Ži.e. 1.4%.. An increase in the
economic incentive from approximately $706 per
year Žmean value. to $2000 per year Žmaximum
value. increased the probability of program adop-

tion from only 1.4 to 5.6%, all else held constant.
A decrease in the duration of program commitment from 14 years Žmean value. to 0 years
Žminimum value. only increased the probability of
program adoption from 1.4 to 3.2%.

5. Summary
This analysis tends to confirm the findings of
several previous studies; landowners are quite
interested in coordinated management, but the
likelihood of NIPF owners actually enrolling in
such programs is quite small. The probability of
coordinated plan adoption remains very small
even when substantial incentives are offered. This
is consistent with the low rates of enrollment in
existing plans in southern New England and is
somewhat alarming with regard to the prospects
for success of ecosystem management of the type
examined here. However, this analysis does suggest ways in which coordinated programs might
be marketed. For example, resource agencies
could target landowners already involved in

forestry-related organizations and programs. Not
only do these landowners appear from our analysis to be more favorably inclined toward coordination, the organizations and programs themselves could be an efficient means for identifying
landowners and disseminating information.
Some of the broader implications of this research from a management plan development
standpoint are that coordinated management
plans will have a higher likelihood of being
adopted if they offer large tax incentives and
short commitments. In terms of other plan characteristics studied here, it is also useful to know
that NIPF landowners do not seem terribly
concerned with the loss of potential timber revenue and they are fairly agreeable to reasonable
public recreational use of their land. The willingness of landowners to make sacrifices Žtimber
harvests, recreation access. and their desire for
flexibility suggests that agencies seeking to develop a viable plan might consider imposing fairly
stringent requirements, but also allowing
landowners to enroll on a trial basis. However, if
wide scale adoption of coordinated management
is to be achieved, something other than the type
of economic incentive examined here will probably
be needed. We suggest that future research should
focus specifically on the reasons why landowners

are uncertain about actually enrolling in coordinated management programs.
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